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RECENT DECISIONS
in order to allow a prosecutor who has been incompetent, or casual, or even ineffective to see if he cannot do better a second time."
Brock v. State of North Carolina,supra at 351.
Irwin N. Davis.
WIZ-NO ELECTION BETWEEN LEGACY AND
QUANTUM MERUIT
Decedent orally promised to leave his five hundred acre farm
to the plaintiffs if they would stay with him until he died. Plaintiffs devoted thirty-six years to the development of decedent's
prqperty. Decedent failed to devise the property but left the
plaintiffs a $30,000 legacy, which they accepted. Held: Although
recovery for the breach of an oral contract was barred by the
Statute of Frauds, recovery was possible in quantum meruit for
Mass.
the value of plaintiffs' services. Turner v. White, (1952).
155
E.
2d
N.
109
The enforceability of agreements to make wills is governed
by the law of contracts. Emery v. Darling,50 Ohio 160, 33 N. E.
715 (1893). Promises to devise realty are within the section of the
Statute of Frauds relating to the transfer of interests in land.
In re Sheldon's Estate, 120 Wis. 26, 97 N. W. 524 (1903). Ordinarily a contract to will property is breached by the failure of the
promisor to execute any will, Mills v. Smith, 193 Mass. 11, 78 N. E.
765 (1906), or by leaving a will with terms contrary to the contract. Phalenv. U. S. Trust Co., 186 N. Y. 178, 78 N. E. 943 (1906).
The breach occurs upon the testator's death, Warden v. Hinds,
163 Fed. 201 (4th Cir. 1908), unless he repudiates the
contract during his lifetime. Carterv. Witherspoon, 156 Miss. 597,
126 So. 388 (1930). Upon the breach of an enforceable contract to
make a will, the promisee can recover damages measured by the
value of the property. Roy v. Pos, 183 Cal. 359, 191 Pac. 542
(1920). Where the oral contract is unenforceable, barring recovery of damages on the contract, the promisee may still recover for the reasonable value of services rendered to the deceased. Robinson v. Raynor, 28 N. Y. 494 (1864); Hensley v.
Hilton, 191 Ind.309, 131 N. E. 38 (1921). In the instant case the
Massachusetts court allowed a recovery in quantum meruit to prevent the Statute of Frauds from being used to allow a defendant
to receive valuable services without paying compensation.
Downey v. Union Trust Co., 312 Mass. 405, 45 N. E. 2d 373 (1942).
Granting the right to recover in quantum meruit, defendant
claimed that the acceptance of the legacy barred the action. The
defense relied on the principle that a person cannot take a benefit
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under the will and at the same time undertake to defeat the will
or prevent its full operation. Sometimes this principle is based on
the doctrine of election, Hyde v. Baldwin, 17 Pick. 303 (Mass.
1818); Fiduciary Trust Co. vz. Mishou, 321 Mass. 615, 75 N. E.
2d 3 (1947) ; Burns v. First National Bank, 304 Ill. 292, 136 N. E.
695 (1922), and sometimes on estoppel. Keys v. Wright, 156 Ind.
521, 60 N. E. 309 (1901); Utermehle v. Norment, 197 U. S. 40
(1905); Hardeman v. Ellis, 162 Ga. 664, 135 S. E. 195 (1926). If
the legacy and the claim for service are not inconsistent there need
be no election. McNaughton v. McClure, 169 Wis. 288, 171 N. W.
936 (1919). In the instant case the court found no inconsistency
between acceptance of the legacy and the claim for services, relying on Hollisterv. Old Colony Trust Co., 328 Mass. 225, 102 N. E.
2d 770 (1952), where the court held that a will is not defeated by
merely diminishing the amount received by the residuary legatees.
A different result might be indicated if plaintiff desired specific
performance, for then the testator's intention regarding the distribution of property would not be given full effect. Gorham v.
Dodge, 122 Ill. 528, 14 N. E. 44 (1887).
One who renders service to the deceased under a contract is
treated as a creditor of the estate. Collier v. Rutledge, 136 N. Y.
621, 32 N. E. 626 (1892). In New York a legacy is not deemed
to be in satisfaction of a debt unless the testator so intended.
In re Card'sEstate, 145 Misc. 686, 260 N. Y. Supp. 764 (Surr. Ot.
1932); Sheldon v. Sheldon, 133 N. Y. 1, 30 N. E. 730 (1892);
Reynolds v. Robinson, 82 N. Y. 103 (1880). Where the testator
agreed to compensate for plaintiff's services, the New York court,
in absence of an indication that the testator meant the legacy as
a gift, allowed the promisee a recovery in quantum meruit only
for the difference between the legacy and the value of the services.
Reynolds v. Robinson, 64-N. Y. 589 (1876); In re Mason's Will,
134 Misc. 902, 236 N. Y. Supp. 720 (Surr. Ct. 1929); accord,
Bumcrots v. Alberti, 132 F. 2d 757 (10th Cir. 1943). The Massachusetts court, on the other hand, decided that the legacy which
the plaintiff received was not even in partial satisfaction of the
debt, because no such intention was expressed in the will. Hollister v. Old Colony Trust Co., supra.
A Connecticut court distinguished between an oral contract
to leave compensation in the form of money, for the breach of
which damages can be recovered, and a devise of real property,
for which no damages can be recovered. In the former the
quantum meruit recovery will be reduced by the amount of the
legacy, while in the latter the legacy will be considered a gift.
Appeal of Spurr, 116 Conn. 108, 163 Atl. 608 (1933). In the
instant case the court assumes the legacy to be a gift.
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RECENT DECISIONS
The present decision reflects the modern trend requiring the
testator to state explicitly any election he may intend in his wifl.
However, it appears quite possible that a different decision might
be reached in other jurisdictions by allowing recovery in quantum
meruit only for the difference between the legacy and the value
of plaintiff's services.
Frank J. Laski
CONFLICT OF LAWS-FOREIGN MARRIAGE INCESTUOUS
BY LEX DOMICILIl HELD VALID
An uncle and niece, at all times domiciled in New York, were
married in Rhode Island, where such a marriage is valid. By New
York Dom. ReL Law § 5 (3) a marriage between uncle and niece
is incestuous and void. The niece died, and her husband sought
letters of administration. Held: Letters granted. In re May's
Estate, - App. Div. -, 117 N. Y. S. 2d 345 (3d Dep't 1952).
The English courts hold that a marriage involving an English
domiciliary, forbidden by English law, although valid where performed, is vbid and the children illegitimate. Brook v. Brook, 9
H. L. Cas. 193 (1861) ; In re Paine [1940] 1 Ch. 46. It is generally
said by American courts that a marriage valid by the law of the
place of celebration is valid everywhere. Van Voorhis v. Brintnall,
86 N. Y. 18 (1881); Fensterwald v. Maryland, 129 Md. 131, 93 Atl.
358, 3 A. L. R. 1562 (1916) ; Goonmen, CONFLICT OF LAws 116 (3d

ed. 1949). The marital status is of primary concern to the domiciliary state. Accordingly, this general rule has been limited on
grounds of policy, and marriages otherwise valid have not been
respected where forbidden by the lex domicilii on grounds of
polygamy, Earle v. Earle, 141 App. Div. 611, 126 N. Y. Supp. 317
(1st Dep 't 1910) ; miseegenatibn, Green v. State, 58 Ala. 190 (1877) ;
bigamy, Bennett v. Smith, 21 Barb. 439 (N. Y. 1856) ; nonage, Ross
v. Bryant, 90 Okl 300, 217 Pac. 364 (1923); incest, United States
v. Rodgers, 109 Fed. 886 (E. D. Pa. 1901).
By the common consent of Christian nations, marriages between persons in the direct line of ascent and descent and
between brother and sister are incestuous. Wightman v. Wightman, 4 Johns. Ch. 343 (N. Y. 1820); Commonwealth v. Lane, 113
Mass. 458 (1873); In re Miller's Estate, 239 Mich. 455, 214 N. W.
428 (1927). However, there is no general agreement as to the
incestuous character of marriages between aunt and nephew,
Martin v. Martin. 54 W. Va. 301, 46 S. E. 120 (1903); Incuria v.
Incuria,155 Misc. 755, 280 N. Y. Supp. 716 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1935);

